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Introduction
When the analysis is restricted ceteris paribus to competition e¤ects, economic theory predicts unambiguously that (partial) horizontal mergers lead to anticompetitive e¤ects and consumer detriment. 1 In light of this, competition authorities around the world follow them closely. Yet, the market dynamics of consolidations, hostile take-overs, friendly (partial) acquisitions and mergers can also generate important synergies. 2 Proper merger policy weighs such merger speci…c e¢ ciencies against the anticompetitive e¤ects of the merger.
In the last decade merger control in both US and EU has opened up to e¢ ciency arguments. 3 They have been admitted in cases to supplement market concentration analyses based on the Hirschmann-Her…ndahl-index (HHI). The US guidelines, revised in 1997 on this point, read: "[T]he merging …rms must substantiate e¢ ciency claims so that the Agency can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted e¢ ciency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged …rm's ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-speci…c. E¢ ciency claims will not be considered if they are vague or speculative or otherwise cannot be veri…ed by reasonable means."(US Department of Justice and US Federal Trade Commission, 1997, Section 4) Similarly, the following section was adopted into the 2004 European merger guidelines:
"The Commission considers any substantiated e¢ ciency claim in the overall assessment of the merger. It may decide that, as a consequence of the e¢ ciencies that the merger brings about, there are no grounds for declaring the merger incompatible with the common market pursuant to Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation. This will be the case when the Commission is in a position to conclude on the basis of su¢ cient evidence that the e¢ ciencies generated by the merger are likely to enhance the ability and incentive of the merged entity to act pro-competitively for the bene…t of consumers, thereby counteracting the adverse e¤ects on competition which the merger might otherwise have." (Commission of the European Communities, 2004, Paragraph 77)
As a result of the ex ante nature of merger control, the balancing of competition and e¢ ciency e¤ects is complicated in practice. E¢ ciencies in particular are "easy to promise, yet may be di¢ cult to deliver." 4 This makes the evaluation of noti…ed mergers costly, requiring considerable resources, time, and expertise. Competition authorities increasingly employ sophisticated economic analysis, including computer 2 See Williamson (1968) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990; . 3 See Kolasky and Dick (2003) on the evolution of US merger control and Lyons (2004) on that in the EU. 4 White (1987) , p. 18. Fisher (1987) adds that: "Such claims are easily made, and, I think, often too easily believed."(op.cit., p.36). See also Lagerloef and Heidhues (2005) and Fabrizi and Lippert (2006) . 2 simulation techniques, to assist in the weighing of the various e¤ects of a merger. 5 Combining structural oligopoly models with econometric speci…cations to quantify predicted market reactions following a merger, these methods advance merger control. Yet, the approach also has limitations. The analyses often are di¢ cult, expensive and time-consuming to perform, even when based on static games and employing only a limited number of variations in demand and cost functions. In addition to these enforcement costs, allowing e¢ ciency argument invites rent seeking from …rms. Moreover, the studies often remain con…dential and undisclosed, which forfeits their potential bene…t of making merger decisions more transparent. 6 In this paper, we propose an alternative method to assess horizontal merger e¢ -ciencies, introducing the Werden-Froeb-index (WFI). The WFI is based on Compensating Marginal Cost Reductions (CMCRs), a concept developed in Werden (1996) and Froeb and Werden (1998) and generalized in this paper. The CMCR of each commodity involved in the merger is the reduction in the commodity's (marginal) production costs after the merger that is minimally required to obtain the status quo in terms of quantities and prices that exists prior to the merger. 7 The WFI is a weighted average of generalized CMCRs, with the weights being the shares in total production of the merged …rm. It is a measure of the relative savings in total (marginal) cost of producing the commodities involved in the merger, that is required to restore pre-merger equilibrium values.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, generalized CMCRs are established for any number of di¤erentiated goods and …rms, of which two or more merge, fully or partially, when competition is either on quantities (Cournot) or on prices (Bertrand). Section 3 de…nes the Werden-Froeb-index. Section 4 sets out its information requirements. Section 5 discusses how to implement the WFI practically in merger control, supplementing standard HHI-analysis. Several numerical examples of mergers in a representative market illustrate the power of the measure. Section 6 concludes. A short routine in MATLAB R for calculating the WFI in a typical merger is given in the appendix.
Compensating Marginal Cost Reductions
The conceptual idea of compensating marginal cost reductions is to establish the e¢ ciency gains that minimally need to materialize in order to o¤-set a merger's competition-reducing e¤ects. similar concept, which they call 'Minimum Required E¢ ciencies' (MREs), in reports for the European Commission. MREs are de…ned as the ratio of the anticompetitive price increase as a result of the merger over the rate at which the (claimed) actual merger-speci…c cost savings are passed on to the consumers.
terms of prices and quantities. Consumers would be indi¤erent between allowing or blocking the merger, if these cost savings would indeed result from the merging parties integrating their business. 8 In any given industry, the CMCR commodity values depend on speci…cs like the nature of the (marginal) production costs, commodity characteristics, and the type of market competition. Gregory Werden and Luke Froeb developed the concept for a limited number of common settings, involving constant marginal costs and two …rms merging fully into one. Werden (1996) models Bertrand competition among di¤erentiated substitute commodities. Froeb and Werden (1998) considers Cournot competition among producers of a homogenous good that di¤er only in their share of the market. 9 In this section, we generalize these contributions in one integrated setup. 10 Note that the concept of CMCRs abstracts from any post-merger reallocation of production to the more e¢ cient divisions of the merged …rm. Although possibly restrictive in the special case of a single homogenous good, it is this assumption that makes the concept generally practical. 11 Furthermore, in the following we abstract from at least two important e¤ects of mergers that involve di¤erentiated commodities. The …rst is that the integrated …rm may have a post-merger incentive to reconsider its portfolio of products, repositioning them by adjusting their di¤erentiation, extending or possibly discontinuing some of its product lines. 12 We assume these e¤ects away by considering a …xed product spectrum. Second, we assume that the mode of competition does not change as a result of the merger.
Consider a market in which n (possibly slightly) di¤erentiated products are produced and supplied by K n di¤erent …rms. Each commodity is produced by only one …rm, but some …rms may produce several commodities. 13 In particular, we assume that …rm k produces m k di¤erent commodities, with P K k=1 m k = n. Without loss of generality, we number commodities such that the …rst m 1 commodities 8 This approach therefore is in line with the consumer welfare standard, as discussed further in Section 5. It does not recognize e¢ ciency defense arguments that, although possibly enhancing total welfare, are not passed on to a su¢ cient extent to consumers, such as merger-speci…c reductions in …xed cost (overhead). See Farrell and Shapiro (2001) . 9 Stennek and Verboven (2003) , Section 4 analyzes these same basic models. In addition, it considers a merger between two …rms out of three, competing on prices in a homogenous commodity produced against di¤erent constant marginal cost levels. 10 In the following, we derive CMCRs in absolute value. In Werden (1996) , as well as in Stennek and Verboven (2003) , the required marginal cost reductions, and MREs, are expressed relative to original marginal cost levels. In Froeb and Werden (1998), a "proportionate" CMCR is presented that is a special case of the WFI-see footnote 23 in Section 3.
11 Stennek and Verboven (2003) include this post-merger cost-minimizing reallocation of production in their presentation of the MREs for the most e¢ cient …rm in the merger only. The issue is discussed further in Section 5.
12 Gandhi et al. (2005) develop simulation analyses in which product variety increases with concentration. Berry and Waldfogel (2001) …nd evidence to the e¤ect in radio broadcasting. 13 We introduce this setup for notational convenience. One way to interpret it is as commodities being (slightly) …rm-speci…c. Yet, for both Cournot and Bertrand competition, in the two subsections below, we also consider the special case of purely homogenous commodities. 4 are produced by …rm 1, commodities m 1 + 1; : : : ; m 1 + m 2 by …rm 2, commodities m 1 + m 2 + 1; : : : ; m 1 + m 2 + m 3 by …rm 3 and so on. Note that this numbering can always be done in such a way that the …rst l …rms are the merging …rms. Also de…ne n k = P k j=1 m k . Obviously, n 0 = 0 and n K = n. Demand for product i is given by the demand function Q i (p) = Q i (p 1 ; : : : ; p n ), where p j > 0 is the price of the j'th product, and p 2 R n ++ is the full price vector. The function Q i (p) is assumed to be positive, continuous and twice continuously di¤erentiable everywhere. Moreover, we assume
Commodity i is called a substitute for commodity j at p if
Mergers may also involve complementary goods previously sold by competing …rms-commodities i and j are complements at p, if
< 0-in which case the merger may, in fact, decrease prices. Assuming the conditions for the inverse function theorem to hold, the inverse demand functions exist as the prices that clear the market at the quantities produced. Denote the inverse demand function for product i by P i (q) = P i (q 1 ; : : : ; q n ) and assume that they are also positive, continuous and twice continuously di¤erentiable.
The costs for …rm k of producing the production bundle q n k 1 +1 ; : : : ; q n k are given by a cost function C k q n k 1 +1 ; : : : ; q n k = C k (q k ), which is strictly positive, increasing in its arguments, and twice continuously di¤erentiable. By c i (q k ) we will denote the marginal costs associated to product i (where n k 1 +1 i n k ). Without making any more speci…c assumptions on the cost functions, we will assume that all equilibria correspond to solutions of the …rst-order conditions and that second-order conditions for a global maximum are always satis…ed. After the …rst l …rms out of the pool of K have merged, the merged entity subsequently faces cost function e C (q 1 ; : : : ; q n l ) = e C (q 1 ; : : : ; q l ). Again, this cost function is strictly positive, nondecreasing in its arguments and twice continuously di¤erentiable. Marginal costs with respect to the production of commodity i (1 i n l ) are denoted by e c i (q 1 ; : : : ; q n l ).
In the following two subsections, we derive CMRCs as the absolute marginal costs reductions required to replicate the pre-merger equilibrium in the post-merger market for fully integrating …rms in Cournot and Bertrand competition respectively. The section closes with a characterization of CMCRs for partial acquisitions.
CMCRs in Cournot Competition
Suppose that …rms use quantities as their strategic variables and prices adjust in such a way that markets clear. For illustrative purposes, …rst consider the special case where, before the full merger, each …rm produces only one product variety-that is K = n, m k = 1 and n k = k for every k. Firm i, producing commodity i, then chooses q i by pro…t maximization
The …rst-order condition for this problem is
for …rm i. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities q are a vector (q 1 ; : : : ; q n ) ; such that (1) is satis…ed for every …rm i. The associated equilibrium prices are given by p i = P i (q ), for i = 1; : : : ; n. Next, consider the e¤ect of a merger between the …rst l …rms. The merged entity's pro…t maximization problem then becomes max q 1 ;:::;q l P 1 (q) q 1 + P 2 (q) q 2 + : : : + P l (q) q l e C (q 1 ; q 2 ; : : : ; q l ) ;
from which the system of …rst-order conditions follows as:
e c 1 (q 1 ; : : : ; q l ) = 0
. . .
for the …rst l commodities. Together with conditions (1) for the …rms l + 1 to n which remain outside the merger, the solution to the post-merger …rst-order conditions de…nes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (q ; p ). Typically, production levels for both the merged …rms (k = 1; : : : ; l) and the independent …rms (k = l + 1; : : : ; n) will be di¤erent from the pre-merger Cournot-Nash equilibrium levels. However, for given quantities q and associated prices p given by p i = P i (q), we can explicitly determine marginal costs e c 1 , e c 2 ; up to e c l such that the post-merger …rst-order conditions (2) are satis…ed for those chosen quantities. The post-merger …rst-order conditions are thus employed to endogenously determine the marginal cost functions c i that result in a speci…c output vector q. For an arbitrary output vector q, this is generally problematic. It requires a full understanding of the inverse demand functions at these quantities. Moreover, the …rst-order conditions for the other …rms also change for q 6 = q . The CMCR concept circumvents these di¢ culties by asking for which values of e c i the post-merger Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities q are exactly equal to the pre-merger Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities q . The bene…t of this status quo approach is that the …rst-order conditions of the nonmerging …rms remain the same and can therefore be disregarded in the analysis.
The necessary absolute marginal cost reductions for each product i to exactly reproduce pre-merger quantities and market prices after the merger follow from com-6 bining conditions (1) and (2), as follows
Note that if all commodities involved in the merger are substitutes, the necessary cost reduction is positive, i.e., 4c i > 0: If all involved commodities are complements, 4c i < 0. When there is a mixed bundle of substitutes and complements involved in the merger, the signs of 4c i are ambiguous.
14 Finally note that the values of 4c i are uniquely determined at the status quo equilibrium, because each commodity's total output remains the same. We need not put any restrictions on the shape of the post-merger cost functions outside equilibrium. 15 Next, we generalize the analysis to cover mergers of any arbitrary number of …rms l that each produce an arbitrary number of varieties m k , with k = 1; : : : ; l. Before the merger, …rm k chooses quantities q n k 1 +1 ; : : : ; q n k by solving
which returns …rst-order conditions
There is a set of such …rst-order conditions for every merging …rm.
14 Note also that the necessary e¢ ciencies might be so large that the post-merger marginal costs need to fall below zero, in which case c i > c i . We do not a priori rule out this (impossible) requirement, since the WFI deals with it quite naturally, as explained in Section 3.
15 Some intuition for the speci…cation of these CMCRs follows from considering total revenue of the merged …rm, e R (q) = P l j=1 q j P j (q), and revenue of …rm i before the merger, which is R i (q) = q i P i (q). The absolute CMCR for product i can be written as
are the associated marginal revenues. Hence, in order to assure that post-merger quantities equal pre-merger levels, the marginal cost reduction should exactly outbalance the reduction in marginal revenue from an increase in producing more of product i. These reductions in marginal revenue are due to the fact that the negative spill-over e¤ects of an increase of q i on prices of the other commodities is internalized, which typically reduces production and increases prices.
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It is convenient to employ some matrix notation from now onwards. Let the following m j m i matrix collect quantity e¤ects of the products sold by …rms i and j:
This matrix is the transpose of the Jacobian matrix of the inverse demand functions of the products supplied by …rm i, or P n i 1 +1 (q) ; : : : ; P n i (q), with respect to the quantities of the commodities produced by …rm j, that is, q n j 1 +1 ; : : : ; q n j . Also denote by q (n l ) = (q 1 ; : : : ; q n l ) 0 the vector of quantities of the commodities sold by the merging …rms, by p (n l ) = (p 1 ; : : : ; p n l ) 0 the vector of corresponding prices, and by c (n l ) = (c 1 ; : : : ; c n l ) 0 the vector of relevant marginal costs. The pre-merger …rst-order conditions (5) for all merging …rms can now concisely be written as
in which
collects the quantity e¤ects of all the products involved in the merger. We use a similar notation for the post-merger situation. The …rst-order conditions for the merged entity read
for i = 1; : : : ; n l ; which can be summarized as
Here
is the transpose of the Jacobian of the inverse demand function of all merging …rms with respect to the quantities of all commodities they supply. This matrix collects all the post-merger quantity e¤ects.
The vector of CMCRs then compactly follows as-with subscript 'C'referring to Cournot competition:
compares pre-and post-merger quantity e¤ects at the status quo.
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The analysis specializes straightforwardly to the case of homogenous commodities and di¤erent market shares. Homogeneity implies a single inverse demand function, P (q 1 ; : : : ; q n ) = P (q 1 + : : : + q n ). Hence,
Furthermore, the marginal costs post-merger must be equal for 'each'merged product. Moreover, from (2) it follows immediately that for each merging …rm i it must be that e c i = e c = P (q) + P 0 (q) P l j=1 q j , where l is the number of merging …rms. It follows then from equation (3) that the compensating reduction in marginal costs for …rm i is given by
Note that our setup can deal with any combination of di¤erentiated and homogeneous commodities as well.
CMCRs in Bertrand Competition
If …rms strategically set prices rather than quantities, we can determine the CMCRs along lines similar to the Cournot case. Consider the general case of a pool of …rms each producing one or more di¤erentiated goods at varying costs, in which l …rms merge. Prior to the merger, …rm k chooses prices p n k 1 +1 ; : : : ; p n k in order to solve
The absolute CMCRs in (9) have an interpretation similar to those in (4). Denote by
the pre-merger revenue of the k'th …rm and the post-merger revenue of the merged …rm, respectively. The compensating marginal cost reduction for a product i which was produced by …rm k before the merger (that is, n k 1 +1 i n k ) is then given by
These …rst-order conditions typically depend on the marginal cost of production of all the merging …rm's products. Therefore, in Bertrand competition, matters are slightly more complicated than in Cournot competition. The reason for this asymmetry is that increasing production of one commodity in a Cournot model will also in ‡uence the prices of the other commodities, but it will not in ‡uence production of the other commodities and hence will leave (marginal) costs unchanged. On the other hand, increasing the price for a commodity will in ‡uence the demand of other commodities and thereby change production and marginal costs for these other commodities, so that these do enter the …rst-order conditions. 17 The endogenous marginal cost levels that assure any particular Bertrand-Nash equilibrium are therefore less obvious to extract.
In matrix notation, the pre-merger …rst-order conditions of the l merging …rms can be compactly expressed as
is assumed to be an invertible n l n l matrix with submatrices
Similar to the matrix of quantity e¤ects (6), matrix (12) represents the transpose of the Jacobian matrix of demand functions of the products produced by …rm i, with respect to the prices of the products produced by …rm j. Q 0 thus collects all pre-merger price-e¤ects of all the commodities involved in the noti…ed merger. The post-merger …rst-order conditions for the fully merged entity are
@Q j (p) @p i = 0 for i = 1; : : : ; n l , 17 Compare equations (5) and (10) .
which can be written as
where
is assumed to be invertible. Combining equation (11) and (13), the vector of CMCRs follows as-with subscript 'B'referring to Bertrand competition:
Note that under the invertibility assumptions, the elements of 4c B are uniquely determined.
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As a result of discontinuities in demand, the case of Bertrand competition in a single homogenous commodity is not a straightforward special case of the analysis above. Assume that the marginal costs of production are constant. If the …rms involved are not equally e¢ cient, the most e¢ cient …rm would serve all of the market pre-merger. Naturally, therefore, all production remains in that division post-merger. Yet, prices are constrained by the production costs of each commodity's nearest (potential) contestant in terms of e¢ ciency. As a result, it is only mergers involving the two most e¢ cient …rms that should raise antitrust concerns in homogenous goods Bertrand competition. The CMCR of the pre-merger most e¢ cient …rm then needs to be such that the pro…t maximizing prices of the merged …rm are equal to the premerger marginal costs of the second most cost-e¢ cient producer in the pre-merger equilibrium (c 2 ). That is, for this special case
and c B = c B e c B :
Note that it is still natural here to use pre-merger production levels as a benchmark for the post-merger situation.
CMCRs in Partial Acquisitions
In both the US and Europe, competition authorities may challenge acquisitions of part of one or more …rms. Partial acquisitions may raise competition concerns if the integration of mutual interests implies control over a former rival. The relationship between ownership and control is complex in general, but particularly so in the case of partial and asymmetric equity ownership acquisitions. However, even when partial equity ownership does not convey operating control, the linking of pro…ts can provide anticompetitive unilateral incentives ranging from softened competition to full joint pro…t maximization. 19 Furthermore, mergers by sequential partial acquisitions may be a long-term concentration strategy. 20 For these reasons, merger regulations recognize the possibility of sole control, even in the case of quali…ed minority share holdings. Similarly, and particularly in the case of joint-ventures, there are potential e¢ ciencies in partial equity interests. In this subsection, we therefore determine CMCRs for more general ownership structures.
Consider
. . . . . .
where 0 w ij 1 is the equity share that …rm i has in …rm j. Assuming all pro…ts are indeed paid out to the owners, P n i=1 w ij = 1 for all j. Given the distribution of ownership, …rm j maximizes its pro…ts P n l j=1 w ij j , either by setting its production level q j (in case of Cournot competition) or its price p j (in case of Bertrand competition), while taking into account the e¤ect that the values of its own choice variables have on the pro…ts of the …rms it owns equity in.
For analytical convenience, and following Froeb and Tschantz (2001), we rescale the ownership weights in such a way that w ii = 1 for each i. Note that this can in principle be done without a¤ecting the optimization problem for individual …rms-although this may involve a slight rearranging of labels. Let this modi…ed ownership matrix be W. If each …rm produces exactly one product and obtains all pro…ts from that production, W equals the identity matrix. If a …rm produces several commodities, this is represented by a square submatrix consisting of ones. For example,
corresponds to a situation where there are two …rms, of which the …rst produces the …rst two commodities and the second the third commodity. A full merger between these two …rms would be presented by a new matrix consisting only of ones. Partial mergers correspond in this framework to o¤-diagonal elements w ij taking on values di¤erent from 0 or 1. Note that the ownership matrix is typically not symmetric.
This setup allows for a straightforward expression of CMCRs when the ownership structure changes from W 0 to W 1 . Consider a market in Cournot competition.
Quantity q i is set in order to solve
Note that we have specialized the cost structure to C (q) = P n j j=1 C j (q j ). That is, we abstract in the following from cross-cost e¢ ciencies, which would typically be very complex to trace in partial mergers.
First-order conditions with respect to commodity i are given by
w ij @P j @q i q j = 0, for i = 1; : : : ; n l ; which in matrix notation can be written as
where corresponds to the Hadamard product. 21 Post-partial acquisition, that is, with the ownership structure changed from W 0 to W 1 , the status quo (p; q) is obtained if
Therefore, the unique absolute CMCRs read
If …rms compete in prices, the analogous problem is …rm i maximizing pro…ts with respect to p i . That is,
Comparing these to the corresponding …rst-order conditions after the change in ownership structure at status quo quantities and prices,
the unique absolute CMCRs are found to be
3 The Werden-Froeb-Index
The generalized CMCRs characterized above are commodity-speci…c and may vary considerably over the products involved in the merger. For practical use of the concept in merger control, the Werden-Froeb-Index collects the di¤erent CMCRs into an average required (marginal) cost savings. The WFI is de…ned generally as
that is, as the sum of CMCRs, each weighted by the quantity produced, divided by the sum of the product of marginal costs and quantity. 22 The WFI can be thought of as the average percentage of cost savings required to replicate the pre-merger market outcome. It weighs those required e¢ ciencies that need to materialize on the products that have a larger share in total production more than on less important products. The WFI summarizes the generalized CMCRs in a single statistic, providing a measure of the total relative decrease in the total marginal costs of producing the commodities involved in the merger required to preserve the status quo. It gives an idea of how much more cost e¢ cient the merged …rm must produce after the merger for its merger-speci…c e¢ ciency gains to overcome the merger's anticompetitive e¤ects.
Using the generalized CMCRs derived above for the case of Cournot and Bertrand competition, the WFI specializes to the following two measures. When …rms compete in quantities:
with, using equations (17), P 0 = W 0 P and P 1 = W 1 P, in case of partial acquisitions.
23 22 Alternatively, the CMCRs can be weighted by the merger-involved commodities'share in revenue. The behavior of the thus de…ned index is very similar to the WFI, but is both less natural and not so convenient to apply. 23 Note that in the case of a single homogenous commodity market
which, with = p Q @Q @p and s i = qi Q , reduces to
for two merging products j and k. This is exactly "the proportionate reduction in marginal cost necessary to restore the pre-merger price", or equation (4), in Froeb and Werden (1998) , p.368.
14 When competition is on prices:
in which to replace, using equations (19) , Q 0 = W 0 Q and Q 1 = W 1 Q in case of partial acquisitions.
Since the CMCR values are unique, and pre-merger sales volumes are given, note that the value of the WFI for each type of competition is unique. Furthermore, the index satis…es several natural axioms regarding proportionality and commensurability. If all relative CMCRs,
, are identical, then the WFI is equal to this relative required reduction. If the unit of measurement of marginal costs changes, the value of the WFI is una¤ected. 24 The WFI is determinate in marginal costs and quantities-although the likelihood of the required post-merger cost levels falling below zero increases when pre-merger marginal cost levels are close to zero. Finally, the measure deals quite naturally with required e¢ ciencies that are so large that post-merger production costs would need to fall below zero, since in the event that 4c i > c i , the value of the WFI is high.
Information Requirements
Since, by construction, post-and pre-merger quantities and prices are identical, calculating the WFI for the purpose of merger control requires a relatively low amount of information that is directly observable. Since the CMCRs are a local measure, the WFI is independent of the speci…c functional forms of market demand and cost of production. It only uses information on the commodities that are involved in the proposed merger. More speci…cally, apart from existing and proposed ownership matrices, it su¢ ces to know the quantities sold of the products o¤ered by the merging …rms prior to the merger (q (l) ), the sales prices (p (n l ) ), the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand), and depending on the latter, the matrix of the a¤ected commodities' quantity-e¤ects (P 1 in the case of Cournot competition) or price-e¤ects (Q 1 in the case of Bertrand competition), both evaluated at the pre-merger market equilibrium. Matrices P 0 and Q 0 follow directly from P 1 and Q 1 by setting all appropriate elements equal to zero.
It is common practice in merger control to obtain and evaluate demand elasticity matrices, rather than just the derivatives and cross-derivatives of (inverse) demand. Regular demand elasticity matrices premultiply price over quantity by the partial derivative of demand with respect to price. The information on Q 1 necessary to establish CMCRs in a market in Bertrand competition can therefore be recovered from standard demand elasticity information, using information on q (l) and p (n l ) . 25 It is not equally straightforward to determine P 1 on the basis of regular demand elasticities. That would require separate speci…c information on the 'inverse demand elasticities', which is not a common concept. Alternatively, information may be available on either the full n n Jacobian matrix of price-e¤ects or the full n n Jacobian matrix of quantity-e¤ects. In that case, the one follows directly as the inverse of the other. Obviously, to know the price-or quantity e¤ects of all commodities in the relevant market is a considerably stronger information requirement than the information on only the a¤ected commodities. Yet, it may be that certain proportionality assumptions apply market wide that allow to construct the full Jacobian from limited information. In Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001), for example, on the assumption that substitution between products is according to their relative market shares, a full approximate demand-elasticity matrix is constructed on the basis of information only about the industry elasticity of demand plus one own-price elasticity. Variations to this speci…c proportionality assumption obviously return di¤erent matrices.
The denominator of the index uses the marginal cost of production. It is not necessary to separately obtain this information, however, as the marginal costs of production are implied by the …rst-order conditions (8) for Cournot competition and (13) for Bertrand competition. The di¤erent marginal production cost levels can straightforwardly be recovered, given sales prices and traded volumes. 26 Total actual (variable) costs of production could be used as a proxy for the base. Although this would stay true to the conceptual nature of the WFI, the use of accounting data is unreliable. Firms may furthermore attempt to manipulate the WFI values of their merger downwards by overstating pre-merger production costs. Finally note that, if need be, the CMCRs and WFI can straightforwardly be formulated in terms of diversion ratios, a concept used in Shapiro (1996) in Werden (1996) . 25 That is, given the n n elasticity-matrix
and given prices p = (p 1 ; : : : ; p n ) and quantities q = (q 1 ; : : : ; q n ), the matrix of price-e¤ects Q can be recovered as
where D (q) and D (p) are diagonal matrices, in which the (i; i)th element is q i or p i , respectively.
The WFI in Merger Control
In their assessment of horizontal mergers, competition authorities attach considerable value to the Hirschman-Her…ndahl-index (HHI) as a measure of market concentration. Merger regulations and guidelines specify threshold values of the HHI for the purpose of self-assessment. Given that the combination of the absolute value of the HHI and the change in its value, HHI, remains below speci…ed critical values, competition authorities in both the US and Europe are unlikely to …nd horizontal competition concerns, as stated in their respective merger guidelines. 27 Only if either of these measures, or both, surpass these values is a deeper Phase II investigation entered.
The use of the HHI for the purpose of assessing whether a merger can be expected to lead to a "substantial lessening" or "signi…cant impediment" of e¤ective competition is not without problems, however. The measure can be deceptively straightforward and miss the competitive discipline of potential entrants, for example in bidding markets. But also in markets where it does apply, the HHI does not discriminate between detrimental and socially desirable mergers. Furthermore, the proper determination of the relevant market is complex and controversial. Also, the HHI uses pre-merger markets shares, thus ignoring the post-merger market e¤ects that it is intended to advise on. Firms may, in reply, attempt to tailor their merger plans so as to stay just within the HHI safe-haven. Most importantly, the analysis is of no assistance in assessing merger-speci…c e¢ ciency gains. Instead, these only come into consideration in a full Phase II inquiry, which is costly and may have unpredictable outcomes. As a result, it is di¢ cult for …rms to self-assess their possibilities for a successful e¢ ciency defense.
The WFI can supplement merger control by providing guidance in this. This would extend the de minimus doctrine to include e¢ ciency claims. As a matter of standard procedure, in notifying a horizontal merger …rms would be required to submit the value of the WFI for their proposed merger-along with documented calculations. 28 This value complements the more general argumentation that e¢ ciency gains can indeed be expected to materialize as a result of the merger. The burden of proof therefore remains on the parties proposing the merger. The validity of the submitted analysis is to be assessed by the competition authorities and can be challenged, in which case the merger can be blocked. The merger guidelines would specify threshold values of the WFI which, in combination with critical HHI values, would in principle allow the merger, even when it does raise competition concerns. That is, a su¢ ciently low (and credible) WFI value can compensate an HHI or HHI value 27 In the US, this is so for all mergers for which the HHI remains below 1000 and all for which HHI remain below 50, as well as for any combination of HHI, HHI below 1800 and 100-see over and above the safe-haven thresholds. A Phase II investigation will only be initiated if unreasonably high compensating cost reductions are necessary to overcome the anti-competitive e¤ects of the merger. Alternatively, a second and upper-bound critical (delta) HHI value may be speci…ed, such that a Phase II investigation is always entered when the merger surpasses this upper-bound threshold, irrespective of its WFI.
To illustrate the proposed application of the WFI and its power in supplementing HHI analysis, consider a hypothetical representative pre-merger market in which eight …rms are in Bertrand competition, each producing a single commodity. Table 1 speci…es regular prices, quantities and demand elasticities of each of these commodities. Between the eight …rms, there are twenty-eight di¤erent complete two-party mergers possible. For all these potential combinations, Figure 1 plots the W F I B versus HHI. 30 Two vertical lines mark the lowest threshold values of HHI= 50 for US merger regulation, and HHI= 150 for EU merger control. As explained above, below these values, mergers are in principle not challenged, independent of their absolute HHI value. A potential threshold value for the W F I B is drawn in at 10%.
The …gure reiterates the weak relationship between CMCRs and HHI or HHI pointed out by Werden and Froeb in their papers. The mergers that are grouped in the lower-left corner of the …gure remain below the EU and/or US threshold values for HHI and require only relatively low e¢ ciency gains as measured by the W F I B . Allowing these mergers to be consummated on standard HHI assessment is in principle correct. Yet, a number of mergers involve high levels of either HHI or 29 The elasticity matrix is so de…ned that, for example, entry (1; 2) represents the elasticity of the demand for commodity 1 with respect to changes in the price of commodity 2, that is, 12 = @q1 @p2 p2 q1 = 0:01: 30 Although this example was constructed, it was inspired by an actual merger. Moreover, it is generic, in that the qualitative e¤ects are robust to (substantial) changes in all the underlying data. The reader is invited to work with the example, or any other set of merger data, using the MATLAB R routine in Appendix A. Note that the dot in the origin of Figure 1 represents eight overlaying cases of …rms merging with themselves. W F I B . Consider the merger labelled A in Figure 1 , which is between …rms 1 and 3, which are both relatively small with respective market shares of 7:6% and 6:5%. The HHI increases through this merger from 2114 to 2213, that is, HHI= 99: The merger's W F I B value is 45:8%. By relying on HHI-analysis alone, without quantifying e¢ ciency gains, this merger would in principle pass European (albeit not US) merger control without remedies, even though it requires considerable merger speci…c e¢ ciency gains to overcome the anticompetitive e¤ects of the merger. Merger B, as another example, has a HHI= 47 and would therefore probably not be challenged in either jurisdiction. It is a merger of …rm 2 with …rm 3. Firm 2 has a market share of 3:6%, which is smaller than that of …rm 1. In addition, the cross-price elasticity of …rm 3's commodity with respect to the price of commodity 1 is roughly fourfold that of commodity 3 with respect to the price of commodity 2. As a result, the W F I B is substantially lower, yet still as high as 20:1%, which may be too much to expect to materialize as a result of the merger. Relying only on standard HHI analysis, without a proper assessment of merger speci…c e¢ ciencies, therefore poses a risk of Type II error, that is, of allowing a merger that should have been blocked from the point of view of consumer welfare.
An example of a merger with the opposite danger is merger C, which is between …rms 5 (market share: 18%) and 6 (market share: 34:1%). Here, the HHI increases to 3339, that is HHI = 1225, as a result of the substantial market shares of the two …rms involved in the merger. Yet, the W F I B = 7:9%. Even though the merger would certainly be challenged, trigger an in-depth investigation, and quite possibly be blocked under both European and US merger regulations, the e¢ ciencies minimally needed for this merger to be welfare enhancing are relatively low. Therefore, Phase II investigation costs could be saved if our proposal to include WFI analysis in merger regulation would be adopted. Indeed, supplementing merger control with W F I analysis has the largest potential for saving on enforcement costs in this category. Mergers that stay below a set WFI threshold value and an additional HHI threshold need then not enter into a Phase II investigation, whereas they would under the present merger criteria. 31 The described use of the WFI has a number of bene…ts. The WFI is an exact and well-de…ned measure, that requires information that is standard available in the market. The measure is easy to interpret and standardizes the submission of evidence for an e¢ ciency defense in Phase I inquiries. The WFI is independent of the functional form of demand and costs, and not sensitive to other model speci…cs as costly merger simulation analyses often are. Therefore, there is little room for presenting overly rosy e¢ ciency claims. At best, the merging parties can downwardly manipulate the WFI by overstating their post-merger own-elasticities and under-stating their crosselasticities. This respectively gives the impression of more than actual competition for their products generally, and less than actual competition between the mergerinvolved commodities. This reduces the anti-competitive e¤ects of the merger, so that its WFI value will be lower. The space for such manipulations is limited, however. Also, wider de…nitions of the relevant market that reduce market shares have only little e¤ect on the WFI.
As the minimally required e¢ ciencies are compared to a …xed target that is speci…ed in the guidelines, use of the WFI leaves little scope for rent seeking by the notifying …rms. As a result, the measure avoids complex and expensive litigation and administrative procedures. As a single statistic, the index can be published without publicly revealing the underlying data, which is often con…dential. In addition, in the case of divestitures or partial mergers, threshold WFI values can guide allowable mutual equity acquisitions. Furthermore, the WFI is inherently based on the consumer welfare standard-which is the principle guidance for both US and EU competition authorities. As a measure of minimally required e¢ ciencies, any merger-speci…c gains that would materialize over and above it would directly bene…t consumers in the postmerger equilibrium.
The WFI furthermore is an upper-bound requirement. In line with the consumer welfare standard, it disallows …xed costs synergies that would potentially contribute to total welfare. It further does not take into account more sophisticated long-term bene…ts that may result from the merger, such as product innovations from combined R&D e¤orts, which are very di¢ cult to quantify. Moreover, as noted above, the concept of the CMCRs-and consequently the WFI-expressly ignores any post-merger cost-minimizing redistribution of production to those division(s) in the merged …rm with the most e¢ cient production technology. In simple settings with a homogenous good produced at constant marginal costs of production, such post-merger reallocations are relatively straightforward, since all production will be located in the single most e¢ cient …rm. However, to determine post-merger production levels at minimally required e¢ ciency gains generally requires considerably more information on the merging …rms. In e¤ect, it would involve a fully speci…ed model of the relevant market, including global information of the multi-product production and cost functions, the functional form and speci…cation of all demands, and possible capacity constraints of all …rms. This goes counter to the conceptual idea of the CMCRs as a local measure. It would remove the bene…t of using the WFI as a practical statistic in merger control. The implication of ignoring post-merger cost minimization is that the WFI structurally overestimates the truly required marginal cost reductions that compensate consumers for the anti-competitive e¤ects of the merger. 32 If implemented in future merger guidelines bearing this in mind, however, the WFI can facilitate self-assessment and focus enforcement.
Finally, note that in order to determine what would be proper threshold values for the WFI to be included in future horizontal merger guidelines is-with the caveats pointed out above-a policy decision that is no di¤erent from the speci…cation of the present HHI safe-havens. These values may consequently di¤er similarly across enforcement regimes. Perhaps anything below 5 per cent can be accepted as reasonably low, or maybe 10 per cent, as drawn in Figure 1 . One possible way to substantiate these thresholds departs from the following observation. In the past two decades of merger control, a number of mergers initially challenged were eventually cleared after a Phase II investigation or by a court inquiry-with or without divestitures. Apparently, despite raising competition concerns, these mergers satis…ed an implicit standard of merger-speci…c bene…ts. Using these past decisions, the implied value of the WFI can be backed out to provide some guidance in this policy matter. We leave this for further research.
Concluding Remarks
The stakes in merger control are high and merit a full weighing of all likely consequences of noti…ed mergers and (partial) acquisitions before deciding to block or clear them. Even more so than a merger's e¤ects on competition, any claimed mergerspeci…c e¢ ciencies are hard to substantiate and di¢ cult for the authorities to verify. The WFI assists in this assessment. The measure integrates concentration and e¢ -ciency e¤ects, and asks what average percentage of total (variable) cost savings need minimally materialize as a result of the merger to compensate consumers for its anticompetitive e¤ects. If the WFI is low, the burden of proof on the proponents of the merger can be lower than when considerable compensating e¢ ciencies are required. Threshold values can be set, below which no extensive investigation is required. The WFI is a point measure that is straightforward to implement, exact, informationally e¢ cient, well-behaved and natural to interpret. It standardizes merger procedures. The measure can provide legal guidance in self-assessment and facilitate the mounting of an e¢ ciency defense, without necessarily opening a full merger inquiry.
Obviously, standardizing the e¢ ciency defense in future horizontal merger guidelines along the lines here proposed does not relieve the competition authorities from their obligation to carefully assess every merger case. In particular, by ignoring e¢ -cient reallocations of production, possible increases in product variety, as well as …xed cost savings, the WFI tends to overestimate the minimally required e¢ ciencies. Depending on global variability in the cost-functions and the relative (cross-)elasticities, therefore, the test may be too strict and lead to desirable mergers being nevertheless blocked. Our proposal to apply the WFI …rstly as a …lter to Phase II investigations partly remedies this problem.
Finally, as with all standardized tests, also the WFI-analysis can be tricked. In particular, notifying …rms can attempt to manipulate the matrix with estimates of quantity-or price-e¤ects. As the local derivatives of demand relate to the availability of substitute commodities, and thus indirectly to the number of …rms and the differentiation of their products, the determination of the relevant market, through a SSNIP-test or otherwise, remains a crucial aspect of the analysis. In a more sophisticated manner, in anticipation of a merger …rms may want to in ‡uence sales prices and quantities. The latter is also a possibility under only the HHI standard, however. Moreover, our generic examples of mergers have so far shown the WFI to be robust to such variations. Faced with the reality that competition law enforcement is costly, the WFI therefore can reliably enhance merger control by facilitating a standardized two-tier e¢ ciency defense.
